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the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

Supreme Court of

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

October 19, 1982
•

. Re:

No. 81-430

Illinois v. Gates

Dear Chief:
have received Byron's letter containing its motion to
reargue this case, made in response to John's earlier
communication regarding our denial of a motion by the
petitioner to enlarge the questions presented for decision.
While I will probably end up voting to grant re-argument, I
do have some mixed feelings about the question which I set
forth in the following paragraphs.
I

My Conference notes indicate that there were at least
five votes to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Illinois without the necessity of adopting a "good faith
exception" to the exclusionary rule in the case of evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant.
If this majority would
adhere to a position that cases such as Aguilar and Spinelli
remain unmodified as the law in this area, and that the

/

Supreme Court of Illinois simply misapplied them, I would
certainly agree that the case would not amount to much, and
that re-argument on the "good faith exception" requirement
would be far preferable than such a result.

But I thought there was also sentiment at Conference -whether or not sentiment harbored by a majority a resort to
my notes does not indicate one way or the other -- that at
the very least Draper should be fully reestablished as an
alternative basis to Aguilar and Spinelli for validating
warrants. I do not think this result is so insubstantial as
to be dismissed out of hand in preference for a re-argument
on the "good faith exception."

Starting with Nathanson v. United States, 290 u.s. 41
(1933), a three page decision from the good old days holding
that a warrant to search a private dwelling may not be
issued unles s th e magi s trate "can find probable cause
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therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under
oath or affirmation," 290 U.S., at 47, the Court has come a
long way in the direction of requiring greater and greater
compliance with what are arguably highly technical
requirements; the cockles of my heart, at any rate, are not
warmed by seeing lower courts struggling in long opinions
with the "veracity prong" and the "knowledge prong" of cases
such as Aguilar and Spinelli. There seems to be another
trend afoot at the same time, which, while not contradicting
the above-mentioned cases, proceeds on much more of a
"totality of the circumstances" approach. Cases such as
Draper v. United States, 358 u.s. 307 ·(1959), United States
v. Ventresca, 380 u.s. 102 (1965), and the opinion of the
majority of Harry's old Court in Spinelli v. United States,
382 F.2d 871 (1967) are examples of these opinions.
think a reconsideration of some of these principles
governing the contents of an application for a warrant is
somewhat overdue, and I cannot as presently advised satisfy
myself that such a result would be a less significant
contribution to the law in this area than would be a "good
faith exception" made to the exclusionary rule. In the case
of a good faith exception, whatever its contours might be,
the magistrates would presumably still be operating under
Aguilar and Spinelli even though the police officers would
be given the benefit of a broader rule in determining
whether the evidence seized pursuant to such warrants should
be excluded. Likewise, in cases where a defendant has
effects seized pursuant to a warrant, is bound over for
trial, but for some reason or another the case is dismissed,
the officers could well face a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 which would be governed by precedents such as Aguilar
and Spinelli.
I

I would find it helpful, in deciding whether to set
Gates for reargument, to be further enlightened on the
contours that a good faith exception would assume.
In the

light of cases such as Procunier v. Navarette, 434 u.s. 555
(1978), and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), dealing
with qualified immunity under §1983, and United States v.
Peltier, 422 u.s. 531 (1975), dealing with "reasonableness"
in the context of retroactivity, it might appear that a good
faith exception would include some sort of objective
reasonableness requirement.
I would also think, however,
that the "reasonableness" component of the test could be
satisfied almost automatically.
It seems to me that it
would defy common sense to expect patrolmen and detectives
to second-guess the supposedly legal judgment of a "neutral
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and detached magistrate," Johnson v. United States, 332 u.s.
10, 14 {1948).
If there is to be more to the test than the
mere obtaining of a warrant from a duly authorized
magistrate, would it involve somewhat relaxed Aguilar and
Spinelli standards? And if it would, are we really better
off with a "good faith exception" than we would be by
reconsidering Aguilar and Spinelli?
·.sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

...

The Conference

